Why British Restricted Nepal to the Kali River in the 1816 Sugauli Treaty

The Kali River (aka Mahakali, Sarada or Ghaghara (Gogra)) appears twice in the Sugauli Treaty. Nepal not only cedes the Terai between the Kali and the Rapti but also renounces the land to the west of the Kali. Given its importance in the treaty, questions arise:

1. Why did the British East India Company (EIC) restrict Nepal to the Kali River?
2. Could they have come further eastward?

This article explores the geographic, economic, and political rationale laid by the EIC to limit Nepal’s western reaches.

1. Before the Sugauli Treaty

Prithvi Narayan Shah established Kathmandu as his capital in 1768. His descendants continued the unification campaign, and by 1809, Gorkha (Nepal) reached the Tista River in the east and the Sutlej River in the west. The British guarantee of the Sutlej River as the eastern border of Ludhiana through the 1809 Treaty of Amritsar limited Gorkha’s expansion. The dominions between Kali and Sutlej, meanwhile, were not satisfied with the strict military bureaucracy of Gorkha. At the same time, the British East India Company (EIC) was anxious about expanding their business in India and beyond the Himalayas.

The expansion of Gorkha and its restrictive approach in dealing with the British interfered with the latter’s intentions. Increasing border disputes with the areas that were now governed under the EIC, the desire of the defeated chiefs of Kumaon and Garhwal to be restored, and Gorkha’s resolution to settle the matter with a fight resulted in the Anglo-Gorkha/Nepal War (1814-1816). Despite initial success, Nepal lost the western theatre battles and had to retire to the east of the Kali River. The war ended with the ratification of the Treaty by Nepal on March 4, 1816.

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2. Kali River in the Sugauli Treaty

The first mention of the Kali River is in Article-III of the treaty, where Nepal had to relinquish the plain lands or the Terai:

The Rajah of Nepal hereby cedes to the Honourable the East India Company in perpetuity all the under-mentioned territories, viz-

The whole of the lowlands between the Rivers Kali and Rapti.

…

Again, in Article-V:

The Rajah of Nepal renounces for himself, his heirs, and successors, all claim to or connextion with the countries lying to the west of the River Kali and engages never to have any concern with those countries or the inhabitants there of.

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3. EIC’s Rationale for Choosing the Kali

The articles of the Sugauli Treaty ended Nepal’s claims over the lands to the west of the Kali River, but they don’t explain why the river was chosen as the boundary. The answers lie in the “Papers Respecting the Nepaul War” published by the EIC in 1824. The papers include correspondence from Lord Moira (aka the Marquis of Hastings, who served Britain against the American Revolution, to the Secret Committee of the EIC¹) along with attached survey reports, intelligence memos, and military strategies. Significant correspondences are discussed below.

3.1 Geographic Rationale

The geography of the Kali River makes it attractive to the British as the boundary. The best rationale can be found in Rutherford’s description:

“This river is the boundary of the two provinces of Kamaon² and Dootee, from its source on the Snowy Mountains to its confluence with the Sardha at Buchesur, a point about three stages above Brehm Deo.  This river loses its name in the Sardha, though it contains a much larger body of water and has a far more distant course. It is said not to be fordable at the remotest point to which it has hitherto been traced. This is explained by describing its channel as extremely confined, so that its depth frequently exceeds its breadth. At Jhol Gaut there is both a joolla and sangah. These are frequently carried away, but may be easily reconstructed. The breadth of the river is only about thirty feet. A guard is usually stationed at the gaut, which is further defended by sungurs. The bank of the river on the right rises to the height of fifteen feet; that on the left continues by a gradual slope up the mountain, from the face of which the sungurs on the right are commanded.”

–T. Rutherford, Assistant Commissary-General, (5 October 1814, Page 104)

The following geographic realities are thus established:

• The Kali River is already an existing administrative boundary between Doti in the east and Kumaon in the west.
• Although the exact headwaters hadn’t been traced in the 1814 survey, it is known from second-hand sources that the river originates in the Himalayan region.
• The Kali River runs through a narrow gorge. Its channel is “extremely confined”. At Jhol Gaut (Jhulaghat), a frequently used crossing point, the breadth of the river is only about thirty feet (nine metres).
• The combination of a guard post and “sungurs” (sangars) means the Kali at Jhulaghat was a formally defended military position, not just a civilian river crossing.
• The Sarada is the tributary of the Kali River but in the plains, it is more popular as the Sarada.

Lord Moira repeats the rationale to the Secret Committee:

“The Kali forms a well-defined boundary from the Snowy Mountains to the plains, and though narrow, it is deep and rapid. The Snowy range inclining towards the south, reaches its extreme point in that direction where it touches the eastern confines of Kumaon. Hence, this is the most defensible of frontier, throughout the extent of the country over which our rule or control has been established. These circumstances at once shew the value of as an advanced position, and render it, if properly defended, a complete barrier against any extension of Goorka power in a western direction, a bulwark to the whole country in its rear. Your Honourable Committee will find, in a very able and judicious report from Colonel Nicolls on the defence of Kamaon, a full confirmation of what is here stated³.”

— Lord Moira (2 August 1815) to the Honourable the Secret Committee (Page 761)

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3.2 Economic Rationale

The Route to Tartary

The EIC was primarily a trading company with competing interests within itself. The Company’s Indian Government based in Calcutta, Bengal, held an opium monopoly and was heavily dependent on opium. But because opium was illegal in China, the Select Committee of the Supercargoes located in Guangzhou or Canton was conscious that its trade could anger the Qings and jeopardize the legal tea-buying operations. Canton officials frequently complained that Calcutta’s opium policy was reckless and threatened to destroy the immensely profitable and stable tea trade that funded much of the Company’s home dividends. They were also against the aggressive political and military activities of the Indian Governor-General.

The Indian officials were, however, concentrated on opening the Himalayan route to Oondes and Tartary.

Oondes or Hundes is the region on the high Tibetan plateau immediately north of the western Himalayas in the vicinity of Lake Manasarovar, Mount Kailash, and the Tibetan town of Gartok. The EIC papers use it as a near-synonym for “the country producing the animal which bears the shawl-wool” because this is where the chiru (Tibetan antelope) and Changthangi goat existed, whose fleece was combed or collected, traded down through the passes, and eventually woven in Kashmir into the famous shawls. William Moorcroft, in Wilson (1841), spells the region “Hiundes” (hiun = snow), which means “land of snow.” The book also includes the map showing the travels of Moorcroft and George Trebeck from 1819 to 1825.

Tartary was the vast area in northern and western China and Central Asia. Although it was largely unknown to the British and Missionaries, they had some idea from Persian and Chinese sources (even if they didn’t believe them completely) that the region would be important in diversifying trade with Peking and Russia.

If the British could find a route from India to Oondes and Tartary, it would not only expand their business but also extend their political outreach (see Section 3.3).

Moorcroft, for instance, confirms his travel to Gardokh (Gartok) in 1812, during his journey to the Manasarovar Lake.

[Gardokh] is little else than an encampment, consisting of a number of small blanket tents, with a few houses of unburnt bricks, of a similar description as the houses of Ladakh: it is, in fact, little more than a trading station, or mart, where in the summer months the natural productions of ‘Tibet and China are exchanged for those of Hindustan and Kashmir.

–Moorcroft in Wilson (1841, Vol. I, Page 363)

Moorcroft also states that he observed in Ladakh:

“…Russian leather and brocades, velvets and broadcloth of Russian manufacture, horses and drugs. The greater part of these imports are destined for the Panjab.”

–Moorcroft in Wilson (1841, Vol. I, Page 357)

It can thus be safely assumed that India and Russia were linked via trade even before Moorcroft knew about it.

Value of the region between the Sutlej and Kali Rivers

The British establish Kumaon as the most viable centre for their aspirations in the Nepal War Papers. For example, Fraser claims Kumaon route as the best:

“There is no question on the advantages possessed by Kamaon over Gurhwall, as a connecting district between India and Tartary, Bootan² and China, as to the easiness of passage and convenience of intercourse.”

— W. Fraser, First Assistant Delhi Resident (30 October 1814, Page 246)

Lord Moira expands on this route:

“…the gap through the vast Himmaleh mountains at the northern point of Kamaon affords, as we have ascertained, not only a practicable, but a commodious road into Tartary.”

— Lord Moira (1 June 1815, Page 552)

Regarding the value of Garhwal, Captain Hearsey notes:

“In Gurhwall are rich copper-mines, iron is in great abundance, tar, hemp, and yards of fir innumerable, sufficient to supply all the navy of England.

— Hyder Young Hearsey (24 Aug. 1814, Page 50)

Lord Moira further adds:

“The province of Kamaon is intrinsically a valuable possession, from its revenue, its mines, and its timber. The command which it is almost certain to give of the exclusive shawl-wool trade may be regarded with much satisfaction. The ready communication which it furnishes with Tartary, offers a market for British manufactures to an undefinable extent; and the facilities which it would give, if necessary, for correspondence with the court of Pekin, is deemed by the Committee at Canton as the happiest check on the dispositions of the Viceroy of Canton.”

— Lord Moira (20 July 1815, Page 673)

Thus, access to Tartary via Kumaon did not only help expand the trade but also improve the relations between Calcutta and Canton.

The Gorkha Problem

But Gorkha was an obstruction. As Hearsay argues:

If the country were given back to the former rajahs, a great flow of commerce would take place, highly beneficial to Great Britain, and British commodities would, by the Bootunt passes of Neetee, Mana, Juraar, and Tucklakote, find their way into Tartary and even China.”

— Hyder Young Hearsey (24 Aug. 1814, Pages 50-51)

It was necessary to push Gorkha out of the region and at least to the east of the Kali River to achieve the British economic goals.

What if Kumaon had not been viable?

The British were not certain about the viability of Kumaon. Adam says:

“All the maps in possession of this Government are so incorrect, that no satisfactory judgement can be framed from them with regard to what the interests of the Company many require in that respect. To the eastward, the Sarda appears to present a natural limit. Still the important object of securing the trade with Tartary through the Himmaleh Mountains against the interference of the Goorkas might not be attained by fixing that river as the boundary; you are, therefore, requested to satisfy yourself on this point: and should It appear that a frontier beyond the Sarda, in the part where it approaches the mountains, would be required for the purpose above-mentioned, the extent of it must be defined, so as that cession of that tract must be made a stipulation in any negociation with the Goorka Government.”

— J. Adam (3 May 1815)

This means in early 1815:

• The British did not have reliable maps of the territory.
• They were not asserting the Sarda/Kali River as the definitive boundary.
• If the Tartary trade route was not available, the boundary would be pushed further eastward.

The EIC, thus, explicitly considered the Tartary trade route as a potential reason to push Nepal to the east of the Kali River. By June 1815, surveys affirmed the trade route to Oondes via Kumaon. Although Nepal’s military prowess in the mountains had proved to be restraining for the British, Nepal also got lucky.

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3.3 Political Rationale

The colliding ideological differences and political and economic interests of the rising Gorkha and British Empires had culminated in the Anglo-Nepal War. Their rivalry in establishing empires resulted in frequent border disputes. Moira writes in his retrospective letter to the Chairman of the EIC:

“The aggressions of the Goorkas had been the subject of complaint of many years… The rapacious spirit of the Goorkas, was, of course, encouraged by success and impunity; our forbearance being ascribed to our fear… The encroachments of the Goorkas became incessant, extended their scale, and were evidently pursued on a systematic plan.”

— Lord Moira (6 Aug. 1816, Page 993)

In the letter to the Secret Committee, dated 20 July 1815 (Page 673), Moira promises the Secret Committee:

“…the whole of the hill country, from the Sutleje to the Sardah or Gorgra, as well as nearly the entire tract heretofore possessed by the Goorkas in the plain.”

Moira says that by defeating Gorkha:

“The power of a neighbour, equally dangerous to you from position, character, and views, has been irretrievably broken.”

In the same letter, Moira claims that by possessing Kumaon and Garhwal, the British would:

“… curb any propensity in the Goorkas to future rupture; for it will be apparent from the map, that all the Goorka fortresses which commanded the passes from the plains are thereby turned.

The military and political goals of the British also resonated with the geographical and economic rationale. Before the war, the Secretary of the Government, J. Adam writes on behalf of Moira:

“The expulsion of the Goorka forces from the country between the Jumna and the Sutleje became an indispensable part of the system, both of military operations and of political arrangements; while with reference to the former, the nature of the country, and the numerical strength of the force which can be brought to act in it, renders the co-operation of the inhabitants in the expulsion of the enemy, and the occupation of the posts from which they may be driven, an object of peculiar importance in a military point of view. It is, accordingly, in this view principally, that the Governor-General has expected to derive advantage from holding out the restoration of the ancient Chiefs, to whom their former subjects are supposed to be attached, and whose re-establishment will evince the resolution of the British Government permanently to exclude the Goorka power.”

…

“The expulsion of the Goorka power from the country between the Sutleje and the Jumna being determined on, as a necessary branch of the measures to be pursued against the Government of Nepaul, the mode of disposing of that country, in the event of its occupation by our arms, became a question for consideration. His Lordship [Moira] does not contemplate terms of peace, after hostilities shall have actually commenced, which will restore to the Goorkas any portion of the possessions in question, from which they may be driven by the events of the war.”

— J. Adam (30 Sept. 1814, Page 63-64)

The following facts can be established:

• The British had an explicit goal of expelling the Gorkhalis from the territories west of the Kali River even before a single shot was fired. The War and the Sugauli Treaty would be designed accordingly.
• Because of the rugged terrain, the number of regular (all-British) forces would be limited. Therefore, direct control of the area would be impractical.
• Promising the restoration of the former hill chiefs meant recruitment of their locals in the British army and demonstrate credibility of the British.

Regarding the restoration, however, Adam asserts:

“…we are under no obligation to restore these Chiefs; that it is act purely gratuitous on our part…”

— J. Adam (30 Sept. 1814, Page 64-65)

But:

“The number of independent principalities lying between the Jumna and the Sutleje is not very considerable…”

— J. Adam (30 Sept. 1814, Page 63)

And there would be significant advantages:

“The natural effect of our exertions for the restoration of these Chiefs, and of the political influence and ascendancy which our success will bring with it, will be, to make them look to us for advice and assistance in their difficulties, which we shall be at liberty to afford or withhold at our option; and we thus, it may be presumed, without the inconvenience of positive obligation, possess all the essential advantages of a declared right of interference.”

…

“Their restoration to their former power and possessions, with a guarantee against the Goorka, or any other foreign power, would probably meet the full extent of their wishes will respect to our alliance.

— J. Adam (30 Sept. 1814, Page 63)

Moira reaffirms:

“The restoration of the families of the Hill Chiefs, on terms of feudal allegiance to the Honourable Company, between the Sutleje and the Ganges, will display your moderation; at the same time that an important barrier is established against Runjeet Sing’s ever getting on the flank of your possessions between the Sutleje and Jumna.”

— Lord Moira (20 July 1815, Page 673)

Moira’s plan was, thus, to establish subservient states to the west of the Kali River that would not only keep the reinstated chiefs happy but also keep Gorkha and Ranjit Singh of Punjab in check.

Gorkha suffered bitter defeats in these Western Fronts. The agreements signed by Bam Shah on 27 April 1815 after the surrendering Almora and other Kumaon forts and by Amar Singh Thapa on 15 May 1815 following the fall of Malaun pushed Gorkhali soldiers to the east of the Kali Rivers. The Sugauli Treaty ended Nepal’s claims to these areas forever.

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4. The Global Geopolitical Analysis

One striking thing within the British correspondences is restraint. There is a constant fear of overuse of finance although Moira retrospectively notes:

… the expense of the war (provided for by a loan on easy terms) has been far short of what a measurement of its nature has caused to be anticipated…

–Lord Moira (20 July 1815, Page 673)

The prize they seek out of the war is limited to the trade route to Tartary through the Himalaya. They are also not interested in total administration of the territories they win. They do it through re-established kings and zamindars with suzerainty ensured.

Why?

Most scholars ascribe it to the structure of the East India Company (see Footnote 1), the small amount of money allocated for the EIC military operations in India, Nepal’s ruggedness, and the need for a buffer state to prevent enraging Peking.

However, these things do not completely add up. Yes, the letters themselves talk about these dynamics, but they still don’t tell the whole story. Parker (2026) points out that the principle of British remaining in the plains wasn’t consistent. They wanted to subdue Nepal even in the early 1840s. So, why should the Indian operations of the EIC, which had a monopoly on opium and generated the highest amount of revenue, act with restraint? Why should the opening of a trade route to Tibet and Tartary be enough when they were also considering advancing to the east of the Kali River if required? Why didn’t they go for direct control of the won territories?

The answer lies in the global geopolitical affairs: the American Revolution (1765–1783), the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815), and the rise of Russia, which would eventually result in the Great Game between Britain and Russia in the 18th century.

4.1 The Loss of the British in America

Although never explicitly named in the 1824 document, the loss of the American colonies in 1783 had a profound effect on British imperial thinking. The American Revolution had demonstrated that direct colonial settlement and governance of a large, self-sufficient population was politically unsustainable. The hill-chief restoration policy in the Nepal war is a direct expression of this lesson: rather than annexing and governing difficult hill terrain directly, install dependent rulers who are “too weak to be formidable” and rely on their self-interest to maintain the relationship.

This is also why Moira, who fought for the British in America from 1775 to 1781, explicitly ruled out the annexation of the entire hill zone between the Sutlej and Jumna as “entirely inexpedient in every point of view.” The ghost of America was partly behind that judgement.

4.2 Napoleon and the European Wars

In 1814, Britain was simultaneously fighting Napoleon in Europe, dealing with the War of 1812 against the United States, managing the post-Second Maratha War (1803-1805) conflicts in India, and now launching a Himalayan campaign. The Anglo-Nepal War was fought while the Napoleonic Wars were still in their final phase. Battle of Waterloo was June 1815, whereas Almora fell and Amar Singh Thapa surrendered at Malaun in May. The wars constrained the British military capacity and shaped every decision. Chittaranjan Nepali (1956) writes in his book “General Bhimsen Thapa” that Nepal would have been more successful if the Anglo-Nepal War had been a decade earlier when the French had weakened the British.

The Nepal War document repeatedly shows British commanders making do with inadequate forces: Marley’s paralysis, Martindell’s embarrassments, the dependence on irregular troops made up of the locals or Gorkha defectors and hill-chief cooperation rather than regular British regiments. The best British regular forces were in Europe. Moira was acutely aware of this constraint. His reason for the hill-chief restoration policy is that Britain simply cannot garrison all the hill posts directly.

After Waterloo and the final defeat of Napoleon in 1815, Britain emerged as the world’s dominant maritime and commercial power with no serious European rival. Then the 1817–1819 Third Anglo-Maratha War, which finally ended Maratha power and gave Britain effective paramountcy over the whole Indian subcontinent, happened immediately post-Waterloo.

4.3 Rise of Russia

Russia defeated Napoleon in 1812 transforming Russia’s strategic position in a way that reverberated all the way to the Himalayan passes.

Before 1812, Russia was a significant but regionally contained European power. After 1801, Russia had emerged as the dominant land power in Europe and Central Asia simultaneously. Its armies had marched to Prussia and Paris and its expansion into the Caucasus and Central Asia was accelerating. The Russo-Persian War of 1804–1813 had just given Russia the Caucasus. Russian traders and agents were already penetrating Bukhara, a Silk Road city, Khiva, and the Kazakh steppe.

The rise of Russia makes the Kumaon-Tartary corridor arguments in the document significant. Moorcroft’s records show Russian cloth moving south through Bukharan merchants. His proposal for intelligence networks through Kashgar, another Silk Road city in China was about monitoring Russian commercial and political penetration of the same Central Asian space Britain hoped to access from the south. Although the Great Game became an explicit policy doctrine only in the 1830s and 1840s, anxiety about Russian expansion toward India is already latently present in the Anglo-Nepal War letters.

After Waterloo, with France permanently weakened and no European challenger remaining, Russia became Britain’s singular strategic concern for the rest of the 19th century. The Himalayan passes were the southern terminus of the strategic corridor along which Russian expansion could theoretically threaten India. This is why the Kamaon-Tartary route mattered not just commercially but as an intelligence and early-warning system. Whoever held those passes could monitor Russian movement through Central Asia before it became a threat to India itself.

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5. Conclusion

The demarcation of Nepal’s boundary at the Kali River in the Sugauli Treaty was not a coincidence but a calculated move by the British East India Company. By recognizing the Kali’s pre-established political importance and formidable natural geography (specifically its narrow, deep channels and defensible crossings) the British established a robust military frontier that neutralized the Gorkha expansionist threat. Simultaneously, claiming the territory to the west, particularly Kumaon, unlocked a vital commercial artery to Tartary and Oondes. This secured access to the lucrative shawl-wool trade and provided the EIC with economic leverage to balance its delicate, tea-dependent relationship with China.

Inherently, the terms of the treaty were shaped just as much by the British limitations as they were by Himalayan topography and Gorkha’s resistance in the mountains. Global geopolitics also influenced decisions. The lingering lessons of the American Revolution dictated the EIC’s policy of indirect rule, prompting them to restore local hill chiefs rather than drain resources through direct colonial administration. Furthermore, against the backdrop of a military stretched thin by the ongoing Napoleonic Wars, creating a dependent buffer zone was the most pragmatic way to ensure regional stability without overcommitting regular British troops.

Most crucially, this boundary decision anticipated the emerging “Great Game”. As a victorious Russia expanded its influence into Central Asia following Napoleon’s defeat, the Kumaon passes transformed from mere trade routes into critical intelligence corridors. In this light, restricting Nepal to the east of the Kali River was not just the conclusion of a regional conflict, but a foundational, century-defining chess move to protect Britain’s Indian empire from encroaching global rivals.

Footnotes

1. The Structure of the East India Company

During the Anglo-Nepal War, EIC had three distinct layers of authority, each with different powers and different relationships to India:

The Court of Proprietors was the general assembly of shareholders. Anyone who held enough EIC stock had a vote. They were the nominal owners of the Company. It is this body that in March 1824 passed the resolution ordering the papers on Nepal to be printed and laid before them. Although they were the ultimate owners, they had very limited day-to-day authority. They were essentially a shareholders’ meeting that could demand accountability after the fact.

The Court of Directors was the working governing board of the Company. It consisted of 24 elected directors who managed commercial operations, appointed officers, approved budgets, wrote instructions to India, and received reports back. When Moira writes to the “Court of Directors,” he is writing to the Company’s own executive board.

The Secret Committee was a subcommittee of the Court of Directors, consisting of only three members (the Chairman, Deputy Chairman, and one other Director), and it operated under entirely different rules from the rest of the Company. It was established and empowered under the India Act of 1784 (Pitt’s India Act), which gave the British Crown’s Board of Control, a government body separate from the EIC, supervisory authority over all political, diplomatic, and military affairs in India.

Therefore, the most important letters in the Nepal Papers, including Moira’s war strategy, peace terms, boundary decisions, and treaty drafts, were addressed to the Secret Committee because they fell under the category of “political and military” matters that Parliament had reserved for Crown oversight via the Board of Control. The Company ran trade; the Crown, in practice, ran war and diplomacy, even when the Company was doing the fighting.

2. Clarification on the names and terms used by the British (English version only)

Goorka = Gorkha

Kamaon and Dootee = Kumaon and Doti. Prior to the Gorkha occupation, the two states were ruled by the Chands and Mallas/Shahis both claiming to be the descendants of the 11th century Katyuris.

Brehm Deo = Brahmadev Mandi. A town established the Katyuri king Brahmadev in the eastern bank of the Kali River, which now falls in Kanchanpur District of Nepal.

Jhol Gaut = Jhulaghat. Named after the suspension bridge on the Kali River. Rutherford describes temporary bridges joola (=jhula): rope bridge, typically two or three ropes strung across the river, one to walk on and one or two to hold, made from twisted grass, bamboo, or cane and sangha (=sanghu): a more substantial wooden bridge, usually a simple beam or plank structure resting on rocks or wooden supports. A permanent suspension bridge was first established by the British in 1877.

sungurs = sangars. Low defensive walls built from piled dry stone — a classic hill warfare fortification to give a soldier cover while commanding the crossing.

Bootan = Bhutan

3. The report of Colonel Nicolls is not publicly available.